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1. Terrorism as an Armed Attack 
A. The "War on Terrorism» 
The expression "war on terrorism" is mere1y a figure of speech or a metaphor: it is not different in principle from the parallel phrases "war on drugs" and 
"war on poverty." The reason is that the expression "war" is not used in either con-
text as a legal term of art. This is easily grasped by anyone who knows in ternational 
law. But the trouble with a catchy phrase is that it is apt to catch its users in a net: in 
time. they (especially if they are laypersons and not international legal experts) 
tend to believe that the figure of speech which they have coined actually reflects 
reality. 
Metapho rs aside, there are two types of war pursuant to international law: 
inter-State (in ternational armed conflicts) and intra-State ("civil wars" or non-
international armed conflicts ). In an in ternational armed conflict, two or more 
belligerent States are locked in combat with each other. Large n wnbers of States are 
currently engaged in the global "war on terrorism.» Yet, the strife qualifies as war in 
the international legal sense only when hostili ties are raging against an enemy State 
that has joined hands with the terrorists. As we shall see, this is true only in the case 
of Afghanistan. I 
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A "civil war" is an armed conflict between the central government of a State and a 
group (or groups) of domestic insurgents, or (absent a central government) between 
various factions vying for power in the State. Whether an internal disturbance 
crosses the threshold of a non-international armed conflict is a matter of gravity of 
scale and intensity. The United States, which has gone through the throes of a genu-
ine "civil war" in its history, should know one when it sees it. In any event, the notion 
that the cross-border, worldwide "war on terrorism" is a non-international armed 
conflict-a notion that seems to have met with favor in the US Supreme Court, in 
the Hamdan case of20062-is manifestly incongruous. 
B. Internal Terrorism 
In any analysis of the struggle against terrorism, the point of departure must be a 
bifurcation between terrorism that is purely internal in character and that which is 
launched from a foreign country and perhaps warrants action in or against that 
foreign country. It is often forgotten that, until September II , 2001, some of the most 
nefarious acts of terrorism were actually local in character. The mega-bombing in 
Oklahoma City as well as the lethal activities of terrorists in Europe (such as Irish 
Republican Army terrorists in the United Kingdom, Basque terrorists in Spain, the 
"Red Brigades" in Italy and the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany) and in Asia 
(e.g., the Tamil "Tigers" in Sri Lanka, Moslem separatists in the Philippines and 
sarin gas-wielding terrorists in the Tokyo subway) were all products of domestic 
terrorism. Even when the atrocity of 9/11 occurred, it is symptomatic that for a 
while nobody knew for sure whether it was an external or an internal attack. Thus, 
when the NATO Council on September 12 decided for the firs t time ever to invoke 
Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty-whereby an armed attack against one 
or more of the allies in Europe or North America "shall be considered an attack 
against them all"l-this was qualified by a caveat that it be determined that the at-
tack was directed from abroad against the United States.4 Such a factual determina-
tion was made only subsequently, on the basis of additional information gathered.S 
The answer to internal terrorism lies in law enforcement. In other words, do-
mestic law enforcement agencies are expected to cope with the crime by searching 
for the terrorists (if they are not killed or captured in the act and are in hiding), 
arresting them, collating the necessary evidence, issuing an indictment, holding a 
trial (based, of course, on due process oflaw), securing a conviction, seeking a 
punishment that fits the crime and ensuring that the court's sentence is in fact 
carried out (so that a convicted terrorist is not pardoned or otherwise released 
from jail before the prescribed time). The law enforcement agencies-the police 
(in all its incarnations, embracing an agency like the FBI in the United States) and 
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the judiciary-may act on the national (or federal) or local (including state, city 
or rural) level. 
Even when terrorism is a matter of domestic law enforcement there may be a 
dire need of foreign cooperation. This may be the case either because some mate-
rial witness or evidence is located abroad, or-if a terrorist manages to flee to a for-
eign country-because extradition (based on a treaty in force ) or some other (less 
formal) means of rendition is required in order to bring the fugitive to justice. Suc-
cess in the extradition of a terrorist may be contingent on the requested country 
not considering his/her act as "political" in character. Stripping terrorism of a po-
litical mantle is the thrust of the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism6 and the bilateral 1985 US-UK Supplementary Extradition Treaty,' 
which has blazed the trail for a whole series of similar bilateral treaties concluded 
by the United States in later years. 
International cooperation is also required in a concerted effort to stop or at least 
impede the financing of terrorism. This is the subject of the 1999 International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.s More signifi-
cantly, it is also the fulcrum of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) ,9 an un-
precedented landmark decision, whereby all UN member States (whether or not 
parties to the Convention ) are obligated to suppress the financing of terrorism , to 
under the supelVision of a special body (the Counter-Terrorism Committee) that 
monitors implementation. 
C. Armed Attacks by Non-State Actors 
The crux of the issue is whether an act of terrorism, launched from abroad by non-
State actors, can be subsumed under the heading of an armed attack in the sense of 
Article 5 1 of the Charter of the United Nations (namely, as a trigger to the target 
State's exercising counterforce in self-defense). When a terrorist act originates out-
side the borders of the target State, a foreign State must somehow be implicated. 
The reason is that it is indispensable for the terrorists to have a base of operations as 
a springboard for their attack. Needless to say, such a base is not likely to be situated 
on the high seas, in outer space or in an unclaimed and uninhabited par t of 
Antarctica. 
Article 51 of the Charter opens with the following words: "Nothing in the pres-
ent Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." As can be seen, 
Article 5 1 talks about an armed attack occurring against a State (a member of the 
United Nations), but it does not say that the attack must be launched by another 
State. This is particularly notable given the comparable phraseology of Article 2(4) 
of the Charter, which mandates that all members (i.e., States) shall refrain from the 
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use offorce in international relations.11 It follows that, under Article 51, an armed 
attack need not be launched bya foreign State; it can also be launched by non-State 
actors from a foreign State. I have always (even prior to 9/11 ) pursued this line of 
thoUght,12 but many other commentators were not convinced in the past. 13 These 
scholarly disagreements should now be regarded as moot, inasmuch as-since 9/11-
the general practice of States has become crystal clear. 
The international response to 9/l1 was unequivocal. Preeminently, both in Res-
olution 1368 (2001) 14-adopted a day after9/11-and in the aforementioned Res-
olution 1373 (2001),1$ the Security Council recognized and reaffirmed in this 
context "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance 
with the Charter." The NATO stand has already been referenced. 16lt may be added 
that in the September 2001 meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, acting as an 
Organ of Consultation, in application of the 1947 Inter-American TreatyofRedp-
rocal Assistance, it was resolved that "these terrorist attacks against the United 
States of America are attacks against all American States."17 This must be under-
stood in light of Article 3 of the Rio Treaty, which refers specifically to an armed at-
tack and to the right of self-defense pursuant to Article 51. 18 
It is true that, in the 2004 advisory opinion on Legal Consequences of the Con-
struction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the International Court of 
Justice (lCD enunciated: "Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of 
an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against an-
other State."19 However, as correctly observed by Judge Higgins in her separate 
opinion: "There is, with respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 that thus stipulates 
that self-defence is available only when an armed attack is made by a State."20 Simi-
lar criticism was expressed in the separate opinion ofJudge Kooijmans21 and in the 
declaration of Judge BuergenthaL22 Indeed, the court itself noted without demur 
Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, drawing a distinction between the 
situation contemplated by these texts (cross-border terrorism) and occupied 
territories.23 
II. Action against Terrorists within a Foreign Territory 
When terrorists perpetrate an armed attack against one State from within the terri-
tory of another State, there are three alternative scenarios of counteraction by the 
target State. 
A. Action by Consent of the Foreign State 
The first possibility is that the foreign State completely dissociates itself from the 
terrorists, who operate within its territory against its will. However, lacking the 
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military wherewithal to eliminate the terrorist bases by itself, the local State invites 
the target State to send in its forces to accomplish (or assist in accomplishing) that 
mission. In such circumstances, the armed forces of the target State will deploy and 
operate against the terrorists on foreign soil with the consent of the government in 
charge. There is no doubt about the legality of such action, as long as the target 
State's expeditionary force carries out its mandate within the terms of the consent 
as granted. Article 20 of the 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for In-
ternationally Wrongful Acts, as formulated by the International Law Commission 
(Il C), sets forth clearly: "Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act 
by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former 
State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent. "2~ 
B. Action against the Foreign State 
The second scenario is the antithesis of the first. The terrorists may act with the full 
approval and even instigation of the foreign State itself, which uses them as an ir-
regular or paramilitary extension of its armed forces. In that case, the armed attack 
is deemed to have been launched by the foreign State itself. In the Nicaragua case of 
1986, the IC) pronounced that "it maybe considered to be agreed that an armed at-
tack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces 
across an international border," but also the dispatch of armed bands or " irregu-
lars" into the territory of another State.15 "The sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which car ry out acts of armed 
force against another State" is specifically branded as an act of aggression in Article 
3(g) of the General Assembly's consensus Definition of Aggression adopted in 
1974.26 In the Nicaragua judgment, the Ie ) took paragraph (g) of Article 3 "to re-
flect customary internationallaw."27 In the post-Nicaragua period, the IC) has 
come back to rely on Article 3(g) in its opinion in the 2005 Congo/Uganda Armed 
Activities case.28 Interestingly, thus far, Article 3(g) is the only clause ofthe Defini-
tion of Aggression expressly held by the Ie) to be declaratory of customary interna-
tionallaw. 
The linkage between terrorists and a foreign State may be entangled and not 
easy to unravel. The cardinal question is whether the terrorists act as the de facto 
organs of that State. In the Nicaragua judgment, it was categorically proclaimed 
that, when the "degree of dependence on the one side and control on the other" 
warrant it, the hostile acts of paramilitaries can be classified as acts of organs of 
the foreign State.29 Yet, the IC} held that it is not enough to have merely "general 
control" by the foreign State. What has to be proved is "effective control" - in the 
sense of close operational control--over the activities of the terrorists.30 
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The ICJ's insistence on "effective control" by the foreign State over the local 
paramilitaries can hardly be gainsaid. However, the proposition that "general con-
trol" does not amount to "effective control"-and that a dose operational control 
is always required-is not universally accepted. Indeed, in 1999, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal fo r the former Yugoslavia 
(lCfY), in the Tadic case, sharply assailed the Nicaragua prerequisite of close oper-
ational control-as an absolute condition of "effective control"-maintaining that 
this is inconsonant with both logic and law.3l The ICfY Appeals Chamber pro-
nounced that "overall control" would suffice and there is no need for close opera-
tional control in every case. n The doctrine of overall control has been consistently 
upheld in successive ICTY judgments (both at the trial and the appeal levels) fol-
lowing the Tadic case.33 
Article 8 of the ILC 200 I Draft Articles on Responsibility of States reads: "The 
conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in faa acting on the instruc-
tions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the con-
duct."34 From the commentary one can draw theconc1usion that the ILC endorsed 
the Nicaragua test of "effective control," although it conceded that the degree of 
control may "vary according to the factual circumstances of each case."35 
The IC} returned to the topic in the Genocide case of2oo7, where the previous 
(Nicaragua ) position was upheld and the Tadic criticism rejected.36 Nevertheless, 
the ICI set forth that the "overall control" test of the ICfY may be "applicable and 
suitable" when "employed to determine whether or not an armed conflict is inter-
national" (which was the issue in Tadic), b ut it cannot be presented "as equally ap-
plicable under the law of State responsibility for the purpose of determining ... 
when a State is responsible for acts committed by paramilitary units, armed forces 
which are not among its official organs.")1 The ICI added that 
the degree and nature of a State's involvement in an armed conflict on another State's 
territory which is required for the conflict to be characterized as international, can very 
well, and without logical inconsistency, differ from the degree and nature of 
involvement required to give rise to that State's responsibility for a specific act 
committed in the course of the conflict.38 
It is doubtful whether the last word has been said on this theme. 
C. "Extra-Territorial Law Enforcement" 
There is a third scenario, intermediate between the two situations discussed so far. 
While the foreign State is not backing the terrorists (who cannot be regarded as its 
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de facto organs, under either the Nicaragua test or even the Tadic test), it withholds 
consent from the target State to the dispatch of troops with a view to the eradication 
of the terrorists. The question is whether the target State is at an impasse-unable to 
act against the terrorists (absent consent) and having no ground to act against the 
foreign State (absent complicity with the terrorists)-or there is some other ave-
nue open for action in conformity with international law. 
As a rule, under internat ional law, as per the 1949 ICJ judgment in the Corfu 
Channel case, every State is under an obligation "not to allow knowingly its terri-
tory to be used fo r acts contrary to the rights of other States."39 Accordingly, a 
State must not allow knowingly its territory to be used for terrorist attacks against 
another State. The premise, of course, is that the local State is capable of rooting 
out the terrorists who are targeting another State. If the local State is incapable of 
doing that (for military or other reasons), the target State-invoking the right of 
self-defense--is entitled to respond to the terrorist anned attack. In other words, 
the target State is allowed to respond to the armed attack mounted from within the 
terri tory of the local State by doing what the local State should have done in the first 
place but failed to do. The emphasis is on the fact that, in these circumstances, the 
target State can employ force against the terrorists (in self-defense) within the ter-
ritory of the local State, even without the consent of the government in charge. I 
call this exceptional state of affairs "extra-territorial law enforcement,"40 but the 
nomenclature is not of major import: it is the normative substance that counts. 
The fons et origo of the norm in question is a famous dictum fonnulated by US Sec-
retary of State Daniel Webster in resolving the Caroline incident of 1837.41 
A paradigmatic illustration of the application in practice of "extra-territorial 
law enforcement" is the recent expedition of Turkish troops into northern Iraq, 
with a view to the elimination of Kurdish terrorists operating from that area against 
Turkey. Nobody is suggesting that the Iraqi government in Baghdad-or even the 
authori ty in control of the Kurdish enclave of northern Iraq-is in complicity with 
the terrorists, who belong to a renegade group. Nevertheless, since the terrorists are 
using Iraqi territory as their base of anti-Turkish operations, and the rather fragile 
government of Iraq is incapable of coming to grips with the problem at this time, 
Turkey has the right to do what the Iraqi government should have done but failed to 
do. There is no anned conflict between Turkey and Iraq. What we do have is "extra-
territorial law enforcement" by Turkey in Iraq. 
I am glad to note that in the IC] 2005 decision in the Armed Activities on the Ter-
ritory olthe Congo case (Congo/Uganda), although the majority judgment glossed 
over the issue, two judges in their separate opinions-Judge Kooijmans and] udge 
Simma---cited my position on the subject.42 In doing so, Judge Kooijmans said: " It 
would be unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right to self-defence merely 
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because there is no attacker State, and the Charter does not so require. "43 And 
Judge Simma concurred.44 
As for the majority position, all that I can say is that-in the past quarter of a 
century-the ICJ addressed the issue of self-defense four times, starting with the 
1986 Nicaragua case45 and going through the Oil Platforms case of 2003,46 the Wall 
advisory opinion of 200447 and the 2005 Armed Activities case.48 Self-defense was 
also mentioned on a fifth occasion (the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion of 
199649). Is it mere1y a coincidence of bad luck that in all these separate proceedings 
the ICJ made serious blunders in the interpretation of the law of self-defense? In 
the Nicaragua judgment there were a number of flagrant flaws, e.g., as regards the 
distinction between more and less grave forms of use of force, the differentiation 
between an armed attack and mere frontier incidents, the non-mention of imme-
diacy as a condition of self-defense, the denial of the right of a third State to act in 
collective self-defense on the basis of its own assessment of the situation and the 
ramifications of failure to report to the Security Council. so In the Oil Plat/onns 
case, apart from repeating uncritically earlier rulings, the court added some dubi-
ous new dicta about the need for an armed attack to be aimed specifically at a target 
State (as if indiscriminate but deliberate mine-laying in international shipping 
lanes is not enough).51 In the Wall advisol)' opinion, we have the untenable brief 
statement on the need for an anned attack to be mounted by one State against 
another State.51 In the Armed Activities case, the court ignored the issue of "extra-
territorial law enforcement."53 And in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the 
mention of self-defense comes in the most awkward fashion, in a notorious 
dispositi/in which the court wrongly meshed the jus in bello with the jus ad bellum.54 
The paradox is that, in 1986, scholars who critiqued the Nicaragua judgment 
(like me) thought that the ICI plummeted to a nadir. But the Nicaragua judgment 
at least gave commentators an opportunity to chew on some juicy morsels of prime 
beef. A quarter of a century later, with decisions that are much more lean-to the 
point of being cryptic and even mystifying-we tend to think of the Nicaragua 
judgment, in retrospect, as the acme of the ICJ contribution on the subject. 
111. The War in Afghanistan 
A. Armed Attack and Self-Defense 
Initially, Taliban-ledAfghanistan was not directly involved in the armed attack un-
leashed byal Qaeda against the United States on 9/11. The Taliban regime in Kabul 
became tainted due to its subsequent behavior. In its judgment of 1980 in the Teh-
ran case, the IC) held that ifthe authorities of one State are required under interna-
tional law to take appropriate acts in order to protect the interests of another State, 
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and-while they have the means at their disposal to do so-completely fail to com-
ply with their obligations, the inactive State bears international responsibility to-
ward the other State.55 By offering a haven to al Qaeda, in disregard of its 
obligations under international law-and disdaining binding Security Council 
resolutions adopted even before 9/11 56- the Taliban regime assumed responsibil-
ity fo r the armed attack against the United States and opened the way to the exer-
cise of forcible US response in self-defense. 
Once the Taliban's brazen refusal to take the required steps against al Qaeda fol-
lowing 9/1 1 became evident, the United States issued an ultimatum, imperatively 
demanding that the al Qaeda bases be closed down and that its leaders be handed 
overY When the Taliban ignored the ultimatum, the United States (with several 
allies) went to war on October 7, 2001. At that juncture, the Taliban regime---despite 
its fa ilure to gain wide recognition---constituted the de facto government of Af-
ghanistan because it was in actual control of more than 90 percent of the country. 58 
A non-international armed conflict had independently flared up in Afghanistan 
long beforehand. This conflict was waged between the Taliban regime, on the one 
hand, and the Northern Alliance, on the other. Once the inter-State war (the 
United States and its allies versus Taliban-Ied Afghanistan and its al Qaeda ally) 
broke out, it was prosecuted simultaneously with the intra-State war (the Taliban 
versus the Northern Alliance) that went on until the fall of Kabul. The two wars 
(inter-State and intra-State), although connected, must be analyzed separately. 
B. International and Non-International Armed Conflicts 
Contral)' to conventional opinion, I believe that the inter-State war in Afghanistan 
that started on October 7, 2001 continues unabated to this vel)' day, despite the 
transformation in the status of the Taliban (who no longer form the de fac to gov-
ernment of Afghanistan). When American and allied troops are fighting the 
Taliban (and their al Qaeda ally) on Afghan or adjacent (Pakistani) soil, this is a di-
rect sequel to the hostilities that led to the ouster of the Taliban from the seat of 
power in Kabul. Both segments (past and present) of the hostilities are consecutive 
scenes in the same drama unfolding in Afghanistan. The inter-State war will not be 
over until it is over. And it will only be over once the Taliban are crushed. 
We still have in Afghanistan-side by side with the inter-State war (the United 
States et al. versus the Taliban )-an intra-State war (the Taliban versus the Karzai 
government in Kabul). Except that, in terms of the intra-State war, the shoe is now 
on the other foot: the Karzai government is installed as the de jure government of 
Afghanistan, whereas the Taliban-originally the central government (if only de 
facto )-are the insurgents. For the credentials ofthe Karzai government, it is ad-
visable to go back to Security Council Resolution 1386, adopted on December 20, 
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2001, which-acting under Chapter VII (Le., in a binding manner)-(i) endorsed 
the Bonn Agreement, concluded earlier that month between various Afghan politi-
cal factions, and (ii) gave its approval to the deployment of the International Secu-
ri ty Assistance Force (ISAF) in consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority 
established by the Bonn Agreement.59 
As long as the international armed conflict goes on in Afghanistan, the jlls in 
bello in all its manifestations is applicable to the hostilities there. The singular fea-
ture of the inter-State war in Afghanistan is that it is conducted on Afghan soil with 
the consent of the Karzai government. This means that, at any point in time, the 
Karzai government (or, in the future, a successor Afghan government) may with-
draw that consent and pull the rug out from under the fee t of the United States and 
ISAF. The latter are fully conscious of the need to avert such an unwelcome devel-
opment. If the United States (as heard at the conference) is applying in the field un-
usual constraints relating to collateral damage---compared to the general strictures 
imposed by the jlls in bello-this is not an indication that the jus in bello is undergo-
ing a metamorphosis. It simply shows that the United States is responsive to the 
concerns of the Afghan government, in whose territory the combat takes place. The 
government of Afghanistan is fully entitled to insist on the fighting against the 
Taliban (and al Qaeda) being conducted with minimal civilian casualties from 
among its citizenry. 
Due to the special circumstances of the hostilities in Afghanistan-primarily, 
the intimate relationship characterizing the alliance between the Taliban and al 
Qaeda-US and allied combat operations against both (as long as they are con-
ducted in and around Afghanistan, including in particular the lawless tribal lands 
of Pakistan ), are clearly fused in a single inter-State armed conflict. 
The differences from the vantage point of the jus in bello between the parallel in-
ternational and non-international armed conflicts in progress in Afghanistan showd 
not be exaggerated. Despite the profound disparity between the two types of armed 
conflicts from the angle of the jus ad bellllm, there is a growing tendency to apply 
much of the jus ill bello to both categories equally.60 Apart from issues of semantics 
(exemplified by inappropriate usage of terms such as "belligerent parties" or even 
"combatants"), there are only three components of the jus ill bello in international 
armed conflicts that-intrinsically----defy application in non -international armed 
conflicts. These are the entitlement to the status of prisoners of war, the law of neu-
trali ty and belligerent occupation. 
Even in the last three respects, there may be some analogies or similarities. The 
rule of non-intelVention on behalf of the insurgents by foreign States takes the 
place of the norms of neutrality. Detention of captured personnel in accordance 
with minimal requirements of hwnan rights comes in lieu of the treatment of 
52 
Yoram Dinstein 
prisoners of war. But there is no avoiding the fact that-in the absence of recogni-
tion ofbelligerency--<aptured insurgents can be indicted and convicted for trea-
son. In countries maintaining capital punishment, upon conviction defendants 
may be sentenced to death. In other jurisdictions, they may languish in jail for life. 
Recognition of belligerency, issued by the central government in the face of 
large-scale rebellion (as happened in the American Civil War), denotes that a non-
international armed conflict will be governed by exactly the same rules that are ap-
plicable in international anned conflicts.61 It is occasionally alleged that recogni-
tion of belligerency has falle n into disuse and that, even if it were to occur, only 
"common Article 3 and not the [Geneva] Conventions as a whole will apply to the 
conflict."62 However, Common Article 3 applies anyhow to any "armed conflict 
not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties,"6l and this is not contingent on any recognition of belligerency. 
Should such recognition be granted, it would undoubtedly signal that the conflict 
has to be treated as ifit were an international armed conflict and that all the norms 
of the jus it! bello (including those relating to the status of prisoners of war, neutral-
ity and belligerent occupation) will become applicable. 
The dilemma of recognition of belligerency is for the present Afghan govern-
ment to wrestle with and resolve as it deems fit. This does not affect the United 
States, since-in any event, as stated64-its armed conflict with the Taliban (as well 
as their al Qaeda ally) has been and remains international in nature. When Taliban 
personnel are captured by American troops, they have to be treated in accordance 
with the jlls it! bello. These captives cannot be considered guilty of treason against 
the United States (although the Afghan perspective maybe different). In principle, 
they would have been entitled to prisoner of war status. However, they may be de-
nied that privilege due to the fact that they are unlawful combatants. I addressed in 
some detail the meaning and consequences of unlawful combatancy at the 2002 
Newport conference on terrorism (shortly after the outbreak of the Afghan War),6S 
and I do not wish to repeat here what I said there. I also do not wish to pursue the 
domestic-constitutional issue of the rights of unlawful combatants to habeas corpus 
within the American judicial system. I merely want to emphasize that Taliban in-
ternees held on Afghan soil in a US detention center (e.g., in Bagram) can be kept 
there only as long as the Afghan government allows the United States to maintain 
such facilities within Afghan territory. 
C. Action against Terrorists outside Afghanistan 
Action taken by the United States and numerous other countries against al Qaeda 
and diverse groups of terrorists in far-flung parts of the globe, beyond the borders 
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of Afghanistan and its environs, do not constitute an integral part of the inter-State 
war raging in Afghanistan. 
AI Qaeda has been active in many parts of the world, ranging from Mesopota-
mia to Somalia, from Hamburg to Madrid. In each instance, a discrete dissection of 
the legal situation is required. However, there is one common denominator, 
namely, the absence of any built-in nexus between the measures taken for the sup-
pression of the local version of terrorism and the inter-State war in Afghanistan. In 
Iraq there is another war which, hopefully, is drawing to a close. In other places, the 
measures taken against the terrorists m ust be seen in the context of law enforce-
ment,66 leavened with sporadic injections of judicial and extrajudicial assistance 
and cooperation by foreign States. 
N . A New Paradigm? 
I cannot resist adding a few words in response to a plea heard at the conference to 
come up with a new paradigm regarding the law of armed conflict. This is by no 
means the first occasion on which I have heard such an exhortation, and I am no 
longer surprised when it comes up. While all international wars are alike, no two 
wars are truly similar to each other. After every major war, it is perhaps natural that 
the international law of armed conflict is weighed and found wanting given the 
novel challenges specific to that war. When the challenges accumulate, it is fre-
quentlysuggested that a new paradigm is required. After World War I, the interna-
tional community was reeling from the carnage of trench warfare and the 
widespread use of gas warfare. After World War II, humankind was shocked by the 
horrors of the extermination camps and compelled to take into account the impact 
of atomic weapons. In both world wars it was contended that they were a category 
unto their own, since they constituted "Total Wars." Then came the Vietnam War, 
which was supposedly unique for it consisted of guerrilla warfare. Kosovo was sin-
gular, because it was exclusively an air campaign. And so it goes: each war leaves its 
special footprints in the sand of time. 
As a matter of fact-and of law-I do not see any pressing need for a new par-
adigm. Of course, there are always new technologies, new weapons and new 
methods of warfare. What these novelties convey is that the law of warfare lags 
behind the actualities of the battleground. Yet, this is not an exclusive hallmark of 
the jus in bello. To a greater or lesser degree, all law lags behind reality. Lawyers al-
ways have to trail events, trying to close gaps that have opened up between real 
life and the law. 
There is a great deal of reluctance on the part of most States today to close any 
such gap---when it becomes readily apparent-by means of a formal treaty, if only 
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because most treaty making today in the field of the jus in bello is controversial. 
However, recent restatements67 show that informal texts (if properly structured 
and formulated) may prove almost as effective as fo rmal treaties. 
In any event, the very difficulty of adopting new treaties only reinvigorates the 
argument against the practicability of setting up a new paradigm. With an old para-
digm---even if it is far fro m perfect-at least we know where we stand. The need to 
have a quid pro quo of rights and obligations has been accentuated at this confer-
ence, and indisputably this is the rub. The advantage of the present law of both in-
ternational and non- international armed conflicts is that, by and large, we stand on 
te"ajirma: we know who is bound or enti tled to do what. Admittedly, the nuclei of 
legal clarity are surrounded by patinas of ambiguity and controversy. But this is the 
inevitable state of all legal norms. The trouble with an innovative legal paradigm is 
that it unbalances the existing paradigms. It is prone to plunge the entire legal sys-
tem into a chaotic transition period in which legal certainty is eroded. Where the 
jus in bello is concerned, what is liable to happen is that the notorious "fog of war" 
will become the "fog of the law of war." 
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